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Public key cryptography based on semigroup actions
Abstract
A generalization of the original Diffie-Hellman key exchange in ∕* found a new depth when Miller [27]
and Koblitz [16] suggested that such a protocol could be used with the group over an elliptic curve. In
this paper, we propose a further vast generalization where abelian semigroups act on finite sets. We
define a Diffie-Hellman key exchange in this setting and we illustrate how to build interesting
semigroup actions using finite (simple) semirings. The practicality of the proposed extensions rely on
the orbit sizes of the semigroup actions and at this point it is an open question how to compute the sizes
of these orbits in general and also if there exists a square root attack in general.     In Section 5 a
concrete practical semigroup action built from simple semirings is presented. It will require further
research to analyse this system.
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Abstract
A generalization of the original Diffie-Hellman key exchange in (Z/pZ)∗ found a
new depth when Miller [27] and Koblitz [16] suggested that such a protocol could be
used with the group over an elliptic curve. In this paper, we propose a further vast
generalization where abelian semigroups act on finite sets. We define a Diffie-Hellman
key exchange in this setting and we illustrate how to build interesting semigroup actions
using finite (simple) semirings. The practicality of the proposed extensions rely on the
orbit sizes of the semigroup actions and at this point it is an open question how to
compute the sizes of these orbits in general and also if there exists a square root attack
in general.
In Section 5 a concrete practical semigroup action built from simple semirings is
presented. It will require further research to analyse this system.
Keywords: Public key cryptography, Diffie-Hellman protocol, one-way trapdoor functions,
semigroup actions, simple semirings.
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1 Introduction
The (generalized) discrete logarithm problem is the basic ingredient of many cryptographic
protocols. It asks the following question:
Problem 1.1 (see e.g. [26]). Given a finite group G and elements g, h ∈ G, find an integer
n ∈ N such that gn = h.
Problem 1.1 has a solution if and only if h ∈ 〈g〉, the cyclic group generated by g. If h ∈ 〈g〉
then there is a unique integer n satisfying 1 ≤ n ≤ ord(g) such that gn = h. We call this
unique integer the discrete logarithm of h with base g and we denote it by logg h.
Protocols where the discrete logarithm problem plays a significant role are the Diffie-
Hellman key agreement [9], the ElGamal public key cryptosystem [10], the digital signature
algorithm (DSA) and ElGamal’s signature scheme [26].
The Diffie-Hellman protocol [9] allows two parties, say Alice and Bob, to exchange a
secret key over some insecure channel. In order to achieve this goal Alice and Bob agree
on a group G and a common base g ∈ G. Alice chooses a random integer a ∈ N and Bob
chooses a random integer b ∈ N. Alice transmits to Bob ga and Bob transmits to Alice gb.
Their common secret key is k := gab.
It is clear that solving the underlying discrete logarithm problem is sufficient for breaking
the Diffie-Hellman protocol. For this reason researchers have been searching for groups where
the discrete logarithm problem is considered a computationally difficult problem.
In the literature many groups have been proposed as candidates for studying the discrete
logarithm problem. Groups which have been implemented in practice are the multiplicative
group (Z/nZ)∗ of integers modulo n, the multiplicative group F∗ = F \ {0} of nonzero
elements inside a finite field F and subgroups [19, 31] of these groups. In recent time there
has been intense study of the discrete logarithm problem in the group over an elliptic curve [3,
16, 27, 26] or more generally the group over an abelian variety [8, 11, 17].
In this paper, we show how the discrete logarithm problem over a group can be seen
as a special instance of an action by a semigroup. The interesting thing is that every
semigroup action by an abelian semigroup gives rise to a Diffie-Hellman key exchange. With
an additional assumption it is also possible to extend the ElGamal protocol.
The idea of using (semi)group actions for the purpose of building one-way trapdoor
functions is not a new one and it appeared in one way or the other in several papers. E.g.
Yamamura [36] has been considering a group action of Sl2(Z). Blackburn and Galbraith [2]
have been analyzing the system of [36] and they have shown that it is insecure. The key
exchange protocol in our paper differs however from [36] and the ‘bit by bit’ computation
of Blackburn and Galbraith [2] does not apply. Other papers where special instances of
semigroup actions appear are [1, 15, 33, 34] and we will say more in a moment.
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section we define G-actions on sets, where
G is an arbitrary semigroup. Under the assumption that G is abelian we define a general
Diffie-Hellman protocol. In Section 3 we consider semigroup actions which can be linearized
in the sense that there exists a computable homomorphism which embeds the semigroup G
into Matn(F), the ring of n× n matrices. Section 4 and Section 5 contain the main results
of the paper. We show how semirings can be used to build interesting abelian semigroup
actions.
A promising practical example which we are describing in Section 5 consists of a two
sided action. The idea of such an action originates in the 2003 dissertation of Maze [24].
Later, Shpilrain and Ushakov [33] have described similar two-sided actions in the context of
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Thompson groups. The semigroups we are studying in Section 5 are built from simple semir-
ings. Simple semirings are of importance as they assure that the induced matrix semiring is
simple. In the special case when the semiring is the ring of integers modulo n Slavin [34] filed
a patent for the described system citing the work of Maze. Neither [33] nor [34] build general
semigroup actions starting from semirings. At this point it is not clear if there exist param-
eter ranges where the described twosided action is simultaneously efficient and practically
secure.
2 The generalized Diffie-Hellman protocol
Consider a semigroup G, i.e., a set that comes with an associative multiplication ‘·’. In
particular we do not require that G has either an identity element or that each element has
an inverse. However, without loss of generality, we will always assume that the semigroup
has an identity. We say that the semigroup is abelian if the multiplication · is commutative.
Let S be a finite set and G a a semigroup. A (left) action of G on S is a map
ϕ : G× S −→ S,
satisfying φ(g · h, s) = φ(g, φ(h, s)). We will refer to such an action as a G-action on the set
S, and when the context is clear, we denote φ(g, s) simply by gs. Right actions are similarly
defined.
We present now the protocols one can define based on semigroup actions:
Protocol 2.1 (Extended Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange) Let S be a finite set, G be
an abelian semigroup, and φ a G−action on S. The Extended Diffie-Hellman key exchange
in (G, S, φ) is the following protocol:
1. Alice and Bob publicly agree on an element s ∈ S.
2. Alice chooses a ∈ G and computes as. Alice’s private key is a, her public key is as.
3. Bob chooses b ∈ G and computes bs. Bob’s private key is b, his public key is bs.
4. Their common secret key is then
a(bs) = (a · b)s = (b · a)s = b(as).
As in the situation of the discrete logarithm problem it is possible to construct ElGamal
one-way trapdoor functions which are based on group actions. The interested reader finds
more details in [25, 28].
One would build a cryptosystem based on a semigroup action only if the following problem
is hard:
Problem 2.2 (Semigroup Action Problem (SAP)): Given a semigroup G acting on a
set S and elements x ∈ S and y ∈ Gx, find g ∈ G such that gx = y.
If an attacker, Eve, can find an α ∈ G such that αs = as, then Eve may find the shared
secret by computing α(bs) = (α · b)s = b(αs) = b(as).
Although the semigroup G need not be finite, the finiteness of S is sufficient in order
to provide a bound for the size of the data during the communication. Nevertheless, if the
action preserves the “size” of s with respect to some fixed representation, finiteness of S is
not necessary.
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Remark 2.3 The traditional Diffie-Hellman key exchange is a special instance of Proto-
col 2.1. For this let:
• G be the semigroup (Z, ·) of integers.
• S be a cyclic group H where the discrete logarithm problem is believed to be difficult.
• s is a generator of the group H and the action is defined by
ϕ : Z×H −→ H
(n, s) 7−→ sn.
The identity sab = (sa)b simply says that ϕ is a commutative G-action and the reader readily
verifies that Protocol 2.1 reduces to the traditional protocol in this case.
Of course, there is an analogue version of the Diffie-Hellman Problem stated in terms of
semigroup.
Problem 2.4 (The Diffie-Hellman Semigroup Problem) Given a finite abelian semi-
group G acting on a finite set S and elements x, y, z ∈ S with y = g · x and z = h · x for
some g, h ∈ G, find (gh) · x ∈ S.
The security of Protocol 2.1 is equivalent to this problem. The only way we know how
to attack Problem 2.4 is to solve SAP. It is unknown if SAP and Problem 2.4 are equivalent.
2.1 Generic attacks on the SAP
First, we should examine the brute force attack. Suppose Eve intercepts as and bs through
an insecure channel and wants to decode the ciphertext a(bs) = b(as). She may want to try
the brute force attack to solve Problem 2.2: she computes gs for all possible g ∈ G until she
finds some α with αs = as. She is then able to break the system as explained above. To
avoid this attack, Bob and Alice must choose G and S sufficiently large and select a good
candidate for s. Namely, if
GEve = {α ∈ G |αs = as}
then the different parameters G, S, s must be chosen such that the size of GEve is small with
respect to the size of G.
If G has the structure of a group (and not just a semigroup) then GEve is simply a left
coset of the stabilizer group
Stab(s) = {g ∈ G | gs = s}
and in this case we are requiring that the quotient group G/Stab(s) is large.
For a general abelian semigroup G we observe that Stab(s) is still a sub-semigroup of G
and every element α ∈ a Stab(s) has the property that α ∈ GEve, i.e., a Stab(s) ⊂ GEve.
Again in this case we require that Stab(s) is small in comparison to G.
Note also that every sub-semigroup H of G gives rise to an equivalence relation on S. If
one has the ability to efficiently compute canonical representatives for the equivalence classes
(among other things), this could potentially be used to an attacker’s advantage. But as we
will see in Section 4, this is not always an easy task.
It is of course an interesting question if a square root attack exists for general semigroup
actions. In the following we explain that for special cases this is possible. In general we do
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not know how to adapt the known algorithms like e.g. baby step giant step, or the algorithms
Pollard rho or Pollard Kangaroo.
Consider an arbitrary instance of the SAP, where one is given a semigroup G (say as a
subset of {0, 1}N , with N not too much larger than log2 |G|), a set X (say as a subset of
{0, 1}M , with M not too much larger than log2 |X|) and ‘black-box’ type functions pi and α
for quickly computing the semigroup product and the action, respectively:
pi : G×G −→ G, α : G×X −→ X.
In addition, one is given x ∈ X and an element y ∈ Gx in the orbit of x. It is also reasonable
to assume the availability of oracles for producing elements of G and X uniformly at random.
The goal then is to find a g ∈ G for which α(g, x) = gx = y. We do not know a method for
solving such an arbitrary instance with O(
√|G|) operations, except in some special cases.
Situation I: Suppose an element g ∈ G is known for which gkx = y for some k ≥ 1. In this
case, one first determines the period and preperiod of g by a method similar to Pollard’s rho
method, which needs O(
√
ord(p)) = O(
√
|G|) operations, where ord(p) is the period plus
the preperiod of g (see the definition in Section 5). Then the baby-step giant-step method
can be applied in an obvious way to find k with another O(
√
ord(p)) = O(
√|G|) operations.
Note: this applies immediately to the case where G is a cyclic group.
Situation II:G is a group, but not cyclic. For typical groups, inverses are easily computable,
but in any case, one may always find inverses with O(
√|G|) group operations, so it suffices
to solve g1x = g2y, from which one obtains (g
−1
2 g1)x = y. For this, a randomized baby-step
giant-step is possible. Compute and store a set A = {h1x, . . . , hmx} for randomly chosen
hi ∈ G and m ≈
√|G|. With clever hashing techniques (or, in the worst case, sorting A) it
is possible to quickly test if a given element of X is in the set A. One then chooses random
values of h ∈ G until one is found with hy ∈ A. If hy ∈ A, we then have hy = hix for some
i, and so g = h−1hi.
If the semigroup is neither a group nor the set-theoretic union of a small number of cyclic
sub-semigroups we do not know how to adapt the algorithms known for the DLP of abelian
groups (see e.g. [4]). In contrast to the DLP problem actions of a semigroup G on a set X can
result in a G-orbit Gs, s ∈ X, consisting of many ultimately periodic orbits {gks | k ∈ N},
g ∈ G. We have observed such phenomena in the action described in Section 5. It is an
open research question to come up with a possible square root attack or to show that under
certain conditions a square root attack cannot exist for general semigroup actions on sets.
For semigroup actions where a square root attack exists and no other attack is known
(like e.g. the DLP over an elliptic curve) it is generally accepted that an orbit size having
160 bits is sufficient for practical security. For cases where no square root attack is known
orbit sizes of 80 bits could be sufficient for practical security.
3 Linear abelian semigroup actions over fields
This section is about linearity in the sense that there is a way to see the semigroup action as
a matrix action on some vector space. We show that if the correspondence between the two
approaches is computationally feasible, then the Diffie-Hellman semigroup problem and the
semigroup action problem may be solved easily. Two examples of such action are presented
at the end of the section.
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Let us describe the situation more specifically. Let F = Fq be the field with q elements.
Suppose we are given an action G × S −→ S, with G a finite abelian semigroup and S a
finite set, a semigroup homomorphism ρ : G −→ Matn(F) (with multiplication as operation)
and an embedding ψ : S −→ Fn such that for all g ∈ G, s ∈ S one has
ψ(g · s) = ρ(g)ψ(s).
So ρ(G) is a commutative sub-semigroup of Matn(F). Let F[G] be the commutative subal-
gebra of Matn(F) generated by the elements of ρ(G).
Suppose there exist polynomial time algorithms that compute the semigroup operation,
the semigroup action, the values of the maps ρ and ψ and polynomial time algorithms that
compute ρ−1(M) for each M ∈ ρ(G) and ψ−1(v) for each v ∈ ψ(S). The next theorem does
not take in consideration the speed of these algorithms. It only describes what can be done
at the level of the linear algebra without taking consideration of the reduction itself. We
also suppose we have access to an oracle Λ that allow us to randomly chose elements in F[G].
This assumption takes into account the desire to capture the situations were the semigroup
G is close to a real matrix algebra.
Theorem 3.1 Let G, S, ψ be arbitrary parameters as above and let k = dimF F[G]. Then:
1. There exists a probabilistic polynomial time reduction of the Diffie-Hellman semigroup
problem to a linear algebra problem over F that can be solved in an expected O(k2n+n3)
number of field operations.
2. Let N = |F[G]|/|G|. There exists a probabilistic polynomial time reduction of the SAP
to a linear algebra problem over F that can be solved in an expected O(N(k2n + n3))
number of field operations.
The above O-constants come from the cost of standard linear algebra problems and bounded
expected values.
Proof: Let x, y = g · x and z = h · x be three elements of S with u,v and w their images in
F
n. We consider the semigroup action problem instance with parameters x and y and the
Diffie-Hellman semigroup problem instance with additional parameter z.
1. Suppose we have chosen randomly k different elements M1, ..., Mk in F[G] ⊂ Matn(F)
with k call to the oracle Λ. The probability that this family is in fact a basis of the
vector space F[G] over F is equal to the probability P that a random matrix chosen in
Matk(F) is invertible, which satisfies
P = Prob (M1, ...,Mk is a basis of F[G])
=
|GLk(F)|
|Matk(F)|
=
(qk − 1)(qk − q)...(qk − qk−1)
qk2
=
(
1− 1
q
)(
1− 1
q2
)
...
(
1− 1
qk
)
>
∏
n>1
(
1− 1
2n
)
> 0.28 > 1/4. (1)
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See [20] for the cardinality of GLk(F). Suppose for the moment that B = {M1, ...,Mk}
is a basis of F[G]. If k > n we extract a sub-family of cardinality n say Mi1 , ...,Min of
M1, ...,Mk such that
SpanFn{Mi1u, ...,Minu} = SpanFn{M1u, ...,Mku}.
Note that this is always possible and can be done in O(k2n) field operations (see [7]).
If k < n then we may simply complete B with enough zero matrices to have a family
of cardinality n. Let us consider the following equations with unknown a1, ..., an ∈ F
and b1, ..., bn ∈ F:
(a1Mi1 + ... + anMin)u = v
and (b1Mi1 + ...+ bnMin)u = w. (2)
If B is a basis, then both possess at least one solution because of the property of
the family Mi1 , ...M1n . If a = [a1, ..., an]
t and b = [b1, ..., bn]
t then Equations (2) are
equivalent to the following :
[Mi1u | ... |Minu] a = v
and [Mi1u | ... |Minu] b = w,
and therefore both possess a solution that can be found by solving an n × n system
of linear equations in F. If the previous systems do not each have a solution, then
we choose another family M1, ...,Mk and restart the process; the number of trials is
expected to be less than 4 by Inequality 1. Therefore we can find the vectors a and b
in O(n3) field operations.
The matrices
Mg = (a1Mi1 + ... + anMin)
and Mh = (b1Mi1 + ...+ bnMin)
satisfy
MgMh =MhMg , Mgu = v and Mhu = w.
Let σ =MgMhu =MhMgu. Since Mgu = ρ(g)u and Mhu = ρ(h)u, we have
σ =MgMhu = ρ(g)ρ(h)u = ψ((gh) · x) =⇒ ψ−1(σ) = (gh) · x
which shows that the Diffie-Hellman semigroup problem instance can be solved after
a resolution of a family of problems that take O(k2n + n3) operations over F.
2. The matrix Mg above belongs to ρ(G) with probability 1/N . Therefore the number of
trials before reaching this state is O(N). If Mg ∈ ρ(G), then g˜ = ρ−1(Mg) is a solution
to the semigroup action problem since ψ(y) =Mgψ(x) = ψ(g˜ · x).
Here are some examples where the previous theorem holds or can be used:
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Example 3.2 LetM be an n×n matrix with entries in F = Fq and G = F[M ] acting on Fn.
If the minimal polynomial of M is m(x) then F[M ] ∼= F[x]/(m(x)) (with this isomorphism
being efficiently computable) and the latter is a vector space of dimension k = deg m 6 n. In
such a situation, both the semigroup action problem and Diffie-Hellman semigroup problem
are trivial.
Example 3.3 This example comes from invariant theory (see e.g. [35] for an introduction
to this classical subject). We will consider a contragradient matrix action on the ring of
polynomials. Fix a finite field F = Fq, an integer d and an abelian sub-semigroup G of
Matn(F). Let Vd be the vector space over F of polynomials in F[x1, ..., xn] of total degree less
or equal to d. The action we are considering is
G× Vd −→ Vd
(A, f(x)) 7−→ A · f = f((Ax)t)
where x = [x1, ..., xn]
t and Ax is the usual matrix multiplication. This action is linear since
A · (f + g) = A · f +A · g. If r = dimF Vd then we can naturally embed Vd in Fr after having
chosen the basis B = {xe11 ...xenn |
∑
ei 6 d} of Vd. This makes the map ψ easy to compute
and to invert. For sake of clarity, we suppose that B = {v1 = x1, ..., vn = xn, vn+1, ..., vr}.
We define the map ρ : G −→ Matr(F) as follows:
ρ(A)ij = (A · vj)i =
(
r∏
k=1
(
n∑
l=1
aklxl
)ek)
i
where vj = x
e1
1 ...x
en
n . So ρ gives the matrix representation of the linear map induced by
the action since the jth column of ρ(A) is the image of the jth basis vector vj . Since all
the polynomials have degree less or equal to d, the right-hand-side can be computed in
O(rnd log d) field operations (see [32, Chapter 1]). Note that ifM ∈ ρ(G), then we can easily
find A such that ρ(A) = M since the ith row of A is contained in the n first components of
the ith column of M . Indeed, if 1 6 i 6 n then
ith column of M = A · vi =
n∑
j=1
aijxj =
n∑
j=1
aijvj .
Once again the previous theorem holds and makes the Diffie-Hellman semigroup problem
as hard as the linear algebra problem in Fr. However note that in that case the semigroup
action problem may still be difficult since the ratio |G|/|F[G]| may take very small values
because of the big dimension expansion from n to r.
4 Linear actions of abelian semirings on semi-modules
In this section we construct semigroup actions on finite sets starting from a semimodule
defined over a semiring. The setup is general enough that it includes the Diffie-Hellman
protocol over a general finite group as a special case. It provides on the other hand the
flexibility to construct new protocols where some of the known attacks against the discrete
logarithm problem in a finite group do not work anymore.
Let R be a semiring, not necessarily finite. This means that R is a semigroup with respect
to both addition and multiplication and the distributive laws hold. It is understood that the
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semiring is commutative with respect to addition. Some authors assume that a semiring has
a neutral element with respect to addition. We will not assume that R has either a zero or
a one.
Let M be a finite semimodule over R. With this we mean that M has the structure of a
finite semigroup and there is an action:
R×M −→ M
such that
r(sm) = (rs)m, (r + s)m = rm+ sm and r(m+ n) = rm+ rn
for all r, s ∈ R and m,n ∈M .
The semigroup action problem in this setting then asks:
“Given elements m,n ∈M find an element r ∈ R such that rm = n.
Before we proceed we would like to explain some of the difficulties in order to derive at
a square root algorithm which solves the SAP. For this note that many square root attacks
seek in this situation a “collision”, e.g. in Pollard’s rho method elements r1, . . . , r4 ∈ R are
sought such that
r1m+ r2n = r3m+ r4n. (3)
If the semiring is a ring then this results in
(r1 − r3)m = (r4 − r2)n
and maybe under benign conditions the semigroup action problem can be solved. If the
semiring (like e.g. the ones we describe in the next section) have in general no additive
inverses this simple reduction from Equation (3) is not possible. The situation is even worse
when R has only a semigroup structure and M is an arbitrary set since in such a situation
no addition is at disposal at all.
We proceed now and show how to derive at an abelian semigroup action starting from a
semimodule whose coefficient ring is not necessarily multiplicatively commutative.
Let Matn(R) be the set of all n×n matrices with entries in the semiring R. The semiring
structure on R induces a semiring structure on Matn(R). Moreover the semimodule structure
on M lifts to a semimodule structure on Mn via the matrix multiplication:
Matn(R)×Mn −→ Mn (4)
(A, x) 7−→ Ax.
The action (4) forms a semigroup-action of the multiplicative semigroup of Matn(R) on
the set Mn. In general Matn(R) is not commutative with respect to matrix multiplication.
However we can easily define a commutative subgroup as follows:
Let C ⊂ R be the center of R i.e., the subset of R consisting of elements that commute
with any other elements. Let C[t] be the polynomial ring in the indeterminant t and let
A ∈ Matn(R) be a fixed matrix. If
p(t) = r0 + r1t+ · · ·+ rktk ∈ C[t]
then we define in the usual way p(A) = r0In + r1A + · · · + rkAk, where r0In is the n × n
diagonal matrix with entry r0 in each diagonal element.
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Consider the semigroup
G := C[A] := {p(A) | p(t) ∈ C[t]}.
Clearly C[A] has the structure of an abelian semigroup. Protocol 2.1 then simply requires
that Alice and Bob agree on a vector s ∈Mn. Then Alice chooses a matrix X ∈ C[A] and
sends to Bob the vector Xs, an element of the module Mn. Bob chooses a matrix Y ∈ C[A]
and sends to Alice the vector Y s. The common key is then the vector XY s which both can
compute since X and Y commute.
In the special case when R = M = F is a finite field one readily reduces the problem to
a simple linear algebra problem over the finite field F.
The situation becomes slightly more interesting if we take as a ring R = Z, the integers
and as module any finite abelian group M = H . The group H is a Z module and Matn(Z)
operates on S := Hn = H × . . .×H via the formal multiplication:
 g1...
gn

 7−→

 a11 . . . a1n... ...
an1 . . . ann



 g1...
gn

 . (5)
If l = lcm {|g1|, . . . , |gn|}, and C ∈ Matn(Z) is a matrix with all entries congruent to zero
modulo l, then (A + C)g = Ag for all A ∈ Matn(Z). Whence, we may simply consider the
action of Matn(Z/lZ) on S.
This problem reduces to a combination of a linear algebra problem and a series of discrete
logarithm problems in H as soon as all the elements {g1, . . . , gn} ⊂ H lie in a common cyclic
subgroup of H . Such an attack is even possible when the Z-action on the abelian group is
more complicated and we refer to the recent system introduced by Climent et. al. [5] and
its cryptanalysis [6].
The situation becomes quite a bit more interesting if we consider general finite semirings
acting on general semi-modules. In the next section we explain an instance where we do not
know how to efficiently attack such a system.
5 A two-sided abelian action based on simple semirings
In this section we describe a particular semigroup action, where we do not know how to
solve the SAP once the parameters have been chosen large enough. The idea of such an
action originates in the dissertation of Maze [24]. Shpilrain and Ushakov [33] have described
a similar two-sided action in the context of Thompson groups and Slavin [34] filed a patent
based on such ideas.
Let us fix a finite semiring R, not embeddable in a field and not necessarily commutative.
Given such a semiring, consider C, the center of R. Throughout this section, we let n denote
an arbitrary positive integer. For M ∈ Matn(R) we denote by C[M ] the abelian sub-
semiring generated by M , i.e., the semiring of polynomials in M with coefficients in C. Let
M1,M2 ∈ Matn(R) and consider the following action:
(C[M1]× C[M2])×Matn(R) −→ Matn(R)
((p(M1), q(M2)), X) 7−→ p(M1) ·X · q(M2).
This action is linear since
p(M1) · (A+B) · q(M2) = p(M1) · A · q(M2) + p(M1) ·B · q(M2).
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Because of this linearity, we avoid the case when R is a finite field (see Theorem 3.1) even if
the initial SAP instance related to this semigroup action looks difficult.
The key-exchange algorithm that results from using this semigroup action in Protocol
2.1 explicitly reads as follows.
Protocol 5.1 (Diffie-Hellman with two-sided matrix semiring action)
1. Alice and Bob agree on a finite semiring R with nonempty center C, not embeddable
into a field. They choose a positive integer n and matrices M1,M2, S ∈ Matn(R).
2. Alice chooses polynomials pa, qa ∈ C[t] and computes A = pa(M1) · S · qa(M2). She
sends A to Bob.
3. Bob chooses polynomials pb, qb ∈ C[t] and computes B = pb(M1) · S · qb(M2). He sends
B to Alice.
4. Their common secret key is then
pa(M1)Bqa(M2) = pa(M1)pb(M1)Sqb(M2)qa(M2) = pb(M1)Aqb(M2).
The corresponding SAP that should be hard is: given M1,M2, S ∈ Matn(R) and T ∈
C[M1]SC[M2] find U1 ∈ C[M1] and U2 ∈ C[M2] so that T = U1SU2. We do not know if it is
necessary for an attacker to solve this problem, but it certainly is sufficient.
The remainder of this section is devoted to describing some necessary conditions on
R for this problem to be difficult, and the existence of semirings meeting these necessary
conditions.
Definition 5.2 A congruence relation on a semiring R is an equivalence relation ∼ such
that a ∼ b implies that ac ∼ bc, ca ∼ cb, a+ c ∼ b+ c and c+a ∼ c+ b for all possible choice
of a, b and c. A semiring R is congruence-free, or simple, if the only congruence relations
are R×R and {(a, a) | a ∈ R}.
Any congruence relation induces a natural semiring structure on the set R/∼ and the
quotient map R −→ R/∼ is a semiring homomorphism. It is also clear that a congruence
relation on R induces a congruence relation on Matn(R) for any n ∈ N.
For cryptographic purposes it is important that the involved semirings are simple to
avoid a Pohlig-Hellman type reduction of the SAP. Indeed any congruence relation on R
yields a projection of the SAP instance onto a quotient semiring, from which one may
gain information about the solution to the original instance. Just as we prefer to work in
groups of prime orders to avoid a Pohlig-Hellman attack, we would like to work in simple
semirings to avoid such a reduction. Let us mention that Monico [29] provided a partial
classification of finite simple semirings in 2002 and that Zumbra¨gel recently provided in
[37] a total classification of non-trivial finite simple semirings together with a method for
explicitly constructing such objects. For this we first define:
Definition 5.3 A zero of a semiring R is an element ‘0’ such that a + 0 = 0 + a = a and
a ·0 = 0 ·a = 0 for all a ∈ R. A one of a semiring R is an element ‘1’ such that a ·1 = 1 ·a = a
for all a ∈ R.
Next we show how to build large simple semirings from small simple semirings. We start
with a technical lemma:
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Lemma 5.4 Let R be an additively commutative semiring with 1 and 0 and let ∼ be a
congruence relation on Matn(R). Then there exists a congruence relation ∼0 on R such that
A ∼ B ∈ MatnR⇐⇒ aij ∼0 bij , ∀ 0 6 i, j 6 n.
Proof: First, given such a semiring R, and M ∈ Matn(R), if M ′ is obtained from M by
a permutation of rows and columns, we prove there exist two invertible matrices S, P ∈
Matn(R) such that M
′ = SMP . Indeed, the statement is true if one consider matrices with
entries in Z and the usual multiplication, i.e., there exist two permutation matrices (therefore
with entries in {0, 1}) such thatM ′ = S ·M ·P with · being the usual matrix multiplication.
It is then straightforward to verify that the same is true with the operation in R because
of the properties of 0 and 1. Let us now prove the stated result. Let f : R −→ Matn(R)
be the map that sends a ∈ R to the diagonal matrix with first diagonal element a and
zeros everywhere else. The map f is a semiring homomorphism. Let ∼0 be the relation
on R defined by a ∼0 b in R if and only if f(a) ∼ f(b) in Matn(R). Observe that ∼0 is a
congruence relation on R. We prove now that the statement of the lemma is true for ∼0.
Let A,B ∈ Matn(R) and J = f(1). Let 0 6 i, j 6 n and Sij, Pij ∈ Matn(R) be permutation
matrices such that
(SijAPij)11 = aij and (SijBPij)11 = bij .
Note that the matrices Sij and Pij exists in Matn(R) by the previous remark. Therefore
JSijAPijJ = f(aij) and JSijBPijJ = f(bij).
‘=⇒’: If A ∼ B then JSijAPijJ ∼ JSijBPijJ and therefore aij ∼0 bij .
‘⇐=’: Clearly
A =
∑
i,j
S−1ij f(aij)P
−1
ij and B =
∑
i,j
S−1ij f(bij)P
−1
ij
and since f(aij) ∼ f(bij), A ∼ B.
As an immediate consequence of this lemma, we have the following theorem which pro-
vides arbitrarily large, finite, simple semirings.
Theorem 5.5 Let R be an additively commutative semiring with 1 and 0 and let n ∈ N.
Then R is simple if and only if Matn(R) is simple.
With the help of this Theorem we can readily build large finite simple semirings with
0,1 which are not rings and not embeddable into fields. The following provides several
explicit examples of some small finite simple semirings with 0,1 which are not rings and not
embeddable into fields.
Example 5.6 Consider the set S = {0, 1} with the operations max and min for addition
and multiplication respectively. One readily verifies that S has the structure of a finite
simple semiring. Note that several polynomial time problems over Z, such as polynomial
factorization, have been found to be NP-hard when considered over this semiring S [14].
The following example was found by computer search.
Example 5.7 Consider the set S6,1 = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} satisfying the following addition and
multiplication rules.
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+ 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 1 2 3 4 5
1 1 1 1 1 1 5
2 2 1 2 1 2 5
3 3 1 1 3 3 5
4 4 1 2 3 4 5
5 5 5 5 5 5 5
· 0 1 2 3 4 5
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 2 3 4 5
2 0 2 2 0 0 5
3 0 3 4 3 4 3
4 0 4 4 0 0 3
5 0 5 2 5 2 5
S6,1 is a finite simple semiring with 6 elements. This is up to isomorphism the only simple
semiring of order 6. This result follows from [29, 37].
Example 5.8 Using the classification of J. Zumbra¨gel derived in [37] it is possible to derive
for many orders addition and multiplication tables. We are grateful to J. Zumbra¨gel for
providing us with the following recently found simple semiring having order 20. Details on
how to construct the addition and multiplication table can be found in [37]. Again one can
show that this is up to isomorphism the only simple semiring of order 20.
+ 0 a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r 1
0 0 a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r 1
a a a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r 1
b b b b c e e f g h i k k l m n o p q r 1
c c c c c f f f h h i l l l 1 n p p q r 1
d d d e f d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r 1
e e e e f e e f g h i k k l m n o p q r 1
f f f f f f f f h h i l l l 1 n p p q r 1
g g g g h g g h g h i m m 1 m n o p q r 1
h h h h h h h h h h i 1 1 1 1 n p p q r 1
i i i i i i i i i i i n n n n n q q q r n
j j j k l j k l m 1 n j k l m n o p q r 1
k k k k l k k l m 1 n k k l m n o p q r 1
l l l l l l l l 1 1 n l l l 1 n p p q r 1
m m m m 1 m m 1 m 1 n m m 1 m n o p q r 1
n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n q q q r n
o o o o p o o p o p q o o p o q o p q r p
p p p p p p p p p p q p p p p q p p q r p
q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q q r q
r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 n 1 1 1 1 n p p q r 1
· 0 a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 a a a a a b b b c a
b 0 0 0 0 a a a b b c a a a b c b b c c b
c 0 a b c a b c b c c a b c b c b c c c c
d 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 d d d d d g g g i d
e 0 0 0 0 a a a b b c d d d e f g g h i e
f 0 a b c a b c b c c d e f e f g h h i f
g 0 0 0 0 d d d g g i d d d g i g g i i g
h 0 a b c d e f g h i d e f g i g h i i h
i 0 d g i d g i g i i d g i g i g i i i i
j 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 j j j j j o o o r j
k 0 0 0 0 a a a b b c j j j k l o o p r k
l 0 a b c a b c b c c j k l k l o p p r l
m 0 0 0 0 d d d g g i j j j m n o o q r m
n 0 d g i d g i g i i j m n m n o q q r n
o 0 0 0 0 j j j o o r j j j o r o o r r o
p 0 a b c j k l o p r j k l o r o p r r p
q 0 d g i j m n o q r j m n o r o q r r q
r 0 j o r j o r o r r j o r o r o r r r r
1 0 a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r 1
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In order that the two-sided semigroup action described in the beginning of this section
is difficult we would like that the sets C[M1] and C[M2] are large with regard to the matrix
size n. The orders of the matrices M1 and M2 chosen to act on the matrix A on the left and
on the right are of prime importance. Indeed the cardinality of the commutative semiring
C[M ] directly depends on the order of M . We study the “sizes” of the orbit of powers of
elements in Matn(S) where S = {{0, 1},max,min}. We will see that these orders give lower
bounds for the maximum orders of elements in any semiring with 0 and 1. Note that since
the semiring Matn(S) is finite any sequence {Mk}k∈N will eventually repeat, i.e., create a
collision of the form Mk = Mk
′
with k 6= k′. Computer experiments also showed that in
general the set C[M ] is much larger than the set Mk =Mk
′
.
Definition 5.9 Let a = {ak}k∈N be a sequence in a finite set such that an = am =⇒ an+1 =
am+1. The order ord(a) of a is the least positive integer m for which there exists k < m
with ak = am. The preperiod pr(a) of a is the largest non-negative integer m such that for
all k > m we have ak 6= am. The period per(a) of a is the least positive integer m for which
there exists an integer N with am+k = ak for all k > N . If g is an element of a semigroup,
then we set ord(g) = ord({gn}n∈N), per(g) = per({gn}n∈N) and pr(g) = pr({gn}n∈N).
Clearly ord(a) = per(a) + pr(a). Returning to the situation of the multiplicative semi-
group of Matn(S), we study the question “How large can the order of M ∈ Matn(S) be?”.
There already exist some results in this direction. To describe them, we recall that for a
given oriented graph G, a strongly connected component (written SCC) of G is a sub-graph
H of G inside which any two vertices i and j belong to a common oriented cycle and H is a
maximal sub-graph with this property. Such a SCC is written H ⊆SCC G. The period of a
strongly connected component is the maximum between the gcd of the length of its cycles
and 1. We refer the reader to [21] for the details.
Proposition 5.10 Let M ∈ Matn(S) and G be the directed graph whose adjacency matrix
is M . Then
1. per(M) = lcm {period of H | H is a SCC of G},
2. The numbers per(M), pr(M) and ord(M) can be computed in O(n
3) time.
This proposition is essentially in [12]. The algorithm given there computes per(M) in
O(n3) time and an easy modification of it allows to computes pr(M) and therefore ord(M).
We introduce now a function that play a crucial role: Landau’s function g. It is defined
by
g(n) = max{ord(σ) | σ ∈ Sn}
= max{lcm {a1, ..., am} | ai > 0, a1 + ...+ am = n}.
It was first studied by Landau [18] in 1903 who proved that
ln(g(n)) ∼
√
n ln(n) as n −→∞. (6)
In 1984, Massias [22] showed that for sufficiently large n,
√
n ln(n) 6 ln(g(n)) 6
√
n ln(n)
(
1 +
ln ln(n)
2 ln(n)
)
, (7)
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the second inequality in 7 being true for all n. Clearly, the function g is increasing. In any
case, we have
max{lcm {a1, .., am} : |a1|+ ... + |am| = n} = exp
(
(1 + o(1))
√
n lnn
)
.
On the other hand, the period of any SCC H ⊂ G is less or equal to |H| and∑
H⊆SCCG
|H| 6 n.
Since the function g is increasing, Proposition 5.10 and Equation (6) give
per(M) 6 g
( ∑
H⊆SCCG
|H|
)
6 g(n) = exp
(
(1 + o(1))n1/2 ln1/2 n
)
.
Further, it is not difficult to see that there always exists an oriented graph G with period
g(n). Indeed if g(n) is reached by a partition a1 + ...+ am = n, then a graph G built out of
cyclic SCCs of order ai satisfies per(M) = g(n). Such a matrix M ∈ Matn(S) that reaches
this bound is in fact a permutation matrix, and as such, it can be seen as an element of any
semirings with 0 and 1. In other words, in any such semiring, the previous bound is reached:
Proposition 5.11 Let n ∈ N and R be a semiring with 0 and 1. Then
max{per(M) |M ∈ Matn(R)} ≥ g(n) = exp
(
(1 + o(1))n1/2 ln1/2 n
)
.
If R = S = {{0, 1},max,min}, then the above inequality is an equality.
The exact computation of g(n), or more precisely, of the partition a1 + ...+ am = n that
yields the maximum g(n), is necessary in order to build explicitly a matrix M ∈ Matn(S)
such that per(M) = g(n). Indeed, the integer g(n) is always a product of primes less or equal
to 2.86
√
n ln(n), c.f. [23]. Therefore the factorization of g(n) can be found in polynomial
time in n. It is also known that the partition of n that gives the maximum lcm has parts
that are all prime powers, c.f. [13], and therefore the factorization of g(n) gives the expected
partition directly. The algorithm given in [30] allows one to compute g(n) for large integers
n, up to n = 32, 000, so the exact determination of the matrix M is not a problem. See
Table 5.1 for a list of values of g(n) with the associated partition.
For a given matrix M ∈ Matn(S), since S[M ] ⊃ {Mk}k∈N, we have
|S[M ]| > ord(M) > per(M),
and the last inequality can give |S[M ]| > g(n) for a wisely chosen M .
The following corollary shows that the size of the sets C[M ] grows exponentially in n for
suitable matrices M as soon as the center C contains the elements 0, 1 of a semiring. Such
matrices can even be constructed in an efficient way.
Corollary 5.12 Let n ∈ N and R be a semiring with 0 and 1 and center C. Then there
is an n × n matrix M with entries in R such that the order of M is larger than g(n) in
particular the size of C[M ] is larger than g(n) as well.
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Table 1: Some values of Landau’s function g
n g(n) Associated partition
256 4243057729190280 8, 9, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23,
29, 31, 41, 43
512 70373028815644182 \ 1, 1, 1, 4, 9, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17,
5899620 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47,
53, 59, 61
1024 855674708268439827 \ 1, 1, 1, 16, 27, 25, 7, 11, 13,
7434193536488991600 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43,
47, 53, 59, 61, 67, 71, 73, 79,
83, 89
We conclude the Section with an example to illustrate how finite simple semirings could
be used to build a practical semigroup action problem.
Example 5.13 Consider the semiring R = S6,1 as defined above. The elements {0, 1}
form the center C of R. We will consider the matrix ring Matn(R) with n = 20. In this
situation the key size is 400 · lg 6 ∼= 1033 bits and the value of Laudau’s g function is
g(20) = 1 · 4 · 3 · 5 · 7 = 420. By the last corollary Matn(R) contains elements M whose
multiplicative order ord(M) is at least 420. For such an element M the abelian semigroup
C[M ] contains all elements of the form
∑k
i=0 riM
i with ri ∈ {0, 1}. The size of the set C[M ]
is upper bounded by 2k+1, where k = ord(M).
The matrices M1 and M2 below are chosen to be close to permutation matrices such
that the orders are actually more than 420. The matrix S is also chosen sparse as computer
experiments with the particular ring S6,1 showed that this leads to maximal possible size of
the possible matrices
C[M1] · S · C[M2].
Upon using these parameters in Protocol 5.1, Alice chooses polynomials p, q ∈ C[t] and
computes
A := p(M1) · S · q(M2)
p, q ∈ C[t] were chosen as private keys by Alice in Protocol 5.1.
It is clear that she has more than 2420 choices to choose a polynomial p ∈ C[t] and for such
a polynomial p(M1) can be computed with at most 420 matrix multiplication and addition.
- Of course Alice can restrict herself to polynomials of smaller degree, say e.g. k < 50 which
leaves still 250 choices for p and for q and which reduces the number of matrix multiplications
and additions to 100, a task quite easy for an average PC.
Assume Alice has chosen the matrices in the following particular way:
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M1=


1 0 00 0 00 00 0 00 0 00 00 0 00
0 0 10 0 00 00 0 01 0 00 00 0 00
0 0 01 0 00 00 0 00 0 00 00 0 00
0 0 00 1 00 00 0 00 0 00 00 0 00
0 1 00 0 00 00 0 00 0 00 00 0 00
0 0 00 0 01 00 0 00 0 00 00 0 00
0 0 00 0 00 20 0 00 0 00 00 0 10
0 0 00 0 10 00 0 00 0 00 00 0 00
0 0 00 0 00 00 1 00 0 00 00 0 00
0 0 00 0 00 00 0 10 0 00 00 0 00
0 0 00 0 00 00 0 02 0 00 00 0 00
0 0 00 0 00 00 0 00 1 00 00 0 00
0 0 00 0 00 01 0 00 0 00 00 0 00
0 0 00 0 00 00 0 00 0 01 00 0 00
0 0 00 0 00 00 0 00 0 00 10 0 00
0 0 00 0 00 00 0 00 0 00 01 0 00
0 0 01 0 00 00 0 00 0 00 00 1 00
0 0 00 0 00 00 0 00 0 00 00 0 10
0 0 00 0 00 00 0 00 0 00 00 0 01
0 0 00 0 00 00 0 00 0 10 00 0 00


M2=


0 00 0 00 0 00 00 0 00 0 00 01 0
0 00 0 00 0 00 00 1 00 0 00 00 0
0 00 0 00 1 00 00 0 00 0 00 00 0
0 01 0 00 0 00 01 0 00 0 00 00 0
0 00 0 00 0 00 00 0 00 0 00 00 4
0 00 0 00 0 00 00 0 00 0 10 00 0
0 20 0 00 0 00 00 0 00 0 00 00 0
0 00 0 00 0 00 00 0 00 0 00 10 0
0 00 1 00 0 01 00 0 00 0 00 00 0
0 00 0 00 0 00 00 3 10 0 00 00 0
0 00 0 00 0 00 00 0 00 2 00 00 0
0 00 1 00 0 00 00 0 00 0 00 10 0
0 00 0 00 0 00 01 0 00 0 00 00 0
0 00 0 01 0 00 00 0 00 0 00 00 0
0 00 0 00 0 00 10 0 00 0 00 00 0
0 00 0 00 0 10 00 0 00 0 00 00 0
1 00 0 00 0 00 00 0 00 0 00 00 0
0 00 0 10 0 00 00 0 00 0 00 00 0
0 00 0 00 2 00 00 0 00 0 01 00 0
0 00 0 00 0 00 00 0 01 0 00 00 0


S =


0 10 0 00 00 0 00 0 00 00 0 00 0
0 01 0 00 00 0 00 1 00 00 0 00 0
1 00 0 00 00 0 00 0 00 00 0 00 0
0 00 1 01 00 0 00 0 00 00 0 00 0
0 00 0 00 01 0 00 0 00 00 1 00 0
0 00 0 00 10 0 00 0 00 00 0 00 0
0 00 0 01 00 0 00 0 00 00 0 00 0
0 10 0 00 01 0 00 0 00 01 0 00 0
0 00 0 00 00 0 10 0 00 01 0 20 0
0 00 0 00 00 0 01 0 00 00 0 00 0
0 00 0 00 00 0 00 1 00 00 0 00 0
0 00 0 00 00 1 00 0 00 00 0 00 0
0 00 1 00 00 0 00 0 10 00 0 00 0
0 00 0 00 00 0 00 0 51 00 0 00 0
0 01 0 00 00 0 00 0 00 10 0 00 1
0 00 1 00 00 0 00 0 00 01 0 00 0
0 00 0 00 00 0 20 0 00 00 0 00 1
0 02 0 00 00 0 00 0 10 00 0 01 0
0 00 0 10 00 0 00 0 00 00 0 10 0
0 00 1 00 00 0 00 0 00 00 1 00 0


A=


01 2 22 0 24 02 2 22 4 24 02 0 0
12 1 12 1 11 11 1 11 4 21 12 1 4
12 1 12 1 11 11 1 11 4 21 12 1 4
12 1 12 1 11 11 1 11 4 21 12 1 4
12 1 12 1 11 11 1 11 4 21 12 1 4
12 2 11 1 21 02 2 25 1 21 11 1 1
12 1 11 1 12 02 2 15 1 12 11 1 1
12 1 11 1 12 02 2 21 4 11 11 1 1
02 2 22 4 24 22 1 12 0 20 02 0 0
02 2 22 4 24 22 2 12 0 22 02 0 0
02 2 22 0 20 22 2 22 0 22 02 0 0
02 2 12 4 24 01 1 11 4 21 02 0 0
02 2 22 4 24 21 1 12 4 21 02 0 0
12 1 11 1 11 11 1 15 1 11 11 1 1
12 1 11 1 11 12 1 15 1 11 11 1 1
12 1 11 1 11 11 1 11 4 11 11 1 1
12 1 11 1 11 11 1 15 1 21 11 1 1
12 1 11 1 14 02 2 15 1 14 11 1 1
12 1 11 1 11 12 1 25 1 11 11 1 1
12 1 11 1 11 02 2 15 1 11 11 1 1


The only way we know for an attacker to break this system would be to find polynomials
p˜ and q˜ such that p˜(M1)Sq˜(M2) = A (or, to solve a similar problem in terms of the matrix B
Bob computes). If the degrees of p, q are in the range of 50 a brute force search will depend
on the size of the set:
S := {p(M1) · S · q(M2) | deg p < 50, deg q < 50}.
An immediate upper bound for the size of the set S is 2100. We did run extensive compu-
tations and could show that S has size at least 225, not sufficient to be used as a practical
system. It will require further research to estimate better the size of S and to understand
how the sizes grow as we increase both the matrices involved and the simple semirings. E.g.
one could run the protocol with the semiring of Example 5.8 and leave the size of the matrices
the same.
In order to describe the efficiency of the system assume that Alice and Bob agree on
matrices of size n, polynomials p, q of degree at most k and a simple semiring R of cardinality
|R| = θ. Then the public key and the data to be transmitted has O(n2 lg θ) bits. The
number of required bit operations during encryption is O(kn3(lg θ)) and the computation of
the common secret key requires O(n3(lg θ)) bit operations. If θ˜ denotes the cardinality of
the center C of R then an upper bound for the size of the set S is θ˜2k.
These complexity estimates suggest that the system should be further analysed in par-
ticular when the sizes of the matrices are small and the sizes of the ring R is large.
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6 Conclusion
An abelian group can be viewed in a natural way as Z-module. In this paper we consider the
situation when an arbitrary semigroup (instead of just the integers) act on an arbitrary finite
set. The generalization of the discrete logarithm problem results in the semigroup action
problem which we study in this paper. In the situation when the semigroup is abelian one
has a natural Diffie-Hellman secret key exchange and a sufficient condition to break the key
exchange is to solve the semigroup action problem.
In the later part of the paper we concentrate on a particular semigroup action. We
consider the situation where a simple semiring acts on a semimodule. This generalizes the
group situation where G is a cyclic group of prime order p, i.e. where the simple ring Z/pZ
is acting on G via exponentiation.
Simplicity of the involved semirings is important in order to avoid Pohlig-Hellman type
attacks. Using a recently found simple semiring of order 6 we illustrate the techniques in an
example. It will require further research to assess the security of such systems.
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